The dropping-zones as planned and the local situation.

This were the major couses of failure on the Arnhem part.

1) The large distance between dropping-zone and main target.
2) Dropping in different lifts. (Not enough planes available for one large dropping.)

Only the first lift arrived on schedule. The rest were late (bad weather), on the wrong spot and worse, not at all.

Later on, supplies were dropt on the right spot but unfortunatly those spots were already taken by the enemy at that time. One of the weaknesses of Airborne troops is, they can't take enough wapens and supplies at once. Therefore quick supplying is essential. In this case many supplies were dropped on the enemy. Because of strict orders to the pilots not to respond to signals from the ground, adjustment of dropping-zones were not possible.

The main target, Arnhem Bridge.

The main target for the 1st Airlandingbrigade, the traffic-bridge of Arnhem. One mile downstream the bridge there was a shipbridge, wich was removed a few days before the landings. Two Miles downstream of the river Rhine lies the railroad bridge, wich was blown up when the first troops arrived to take it. Five Miles downstream was the fourth rivercrossing "The Drielse Ferry". Wich was sunk on wednesday 20st by the Dutch ferryman Pieter Hensen.

Houses direct to the left and to the right of the bridge, offering a splendid strategic position to overlook the bridge directly. On this air-reconaissance photo there are a few boats who were not there when the battle began. Later on in this report there will be much more on the development of the occupation of the North side of the bridge and the battle-front here. There will be more pictures taken during the battle and detailed maps will be shown.

Enemy positions on 17 September. Brittish Intelligence did not take notice of the warnings of the Dutch resistance. Dutch resistance was well organized and had send detailed reports about the growing strenght of German troops. Alarming was the presence of headquarters of the 9.SS and 10.SS divisions as you can see on this map. Dutch resistance spotted staf-cars of high SS officers. They also notified Brittish intelligence about the presence of armoured cars and tanks in the woods around Arnhem. Also present are the Dutch SS trainees, and the SS trainings school of Major Sepp Krafft. And there is the strong presence of Luftwaffe forces around the airfield of Deelen. Near the airfield, the location of a large Bunker- complex called DIOGENES. Headquarters of "3rd Jagddivision", which still exists today.

Plan of Action

The plan of action decided for the first Airborne Division was largely dictated by three factors.

1: It was thought that the enemy flak from Deelen airfield and the town of Arnhem was likely to be too intense to permit aircraft carrying parachute troops or towing gliders to pass over or close to those areas. Therefore the landings could not be carried out on the open ground south of Arnhem and close to the bridges. The only alternative landing areas were the large open spaces north and south of the railway west of Wolfheze station.
2: With the numbers of aircraft and gliders available it would take three separate lifts to transport the whole Division and the Polish Brigade to the area.
3: The enemy situation. Information on this was rather scanty. In brief, the Division was informed that immediate opposition was unlikely to exceed a force of about three thousand men with some tanks. In fact, the major part of the 2nd S.S. Panzer Corps was reorganizing in the neighbourhood of Arnhem at that time.

From consideration of these and other factors the Divisional Commander decided upon a plan the outline of which was as follows. The Division would land by daylight in three lifts on three consecutive days. On the first day the lst Parachute Brigade would land by parachute in the area west of Wolfheze with the task of advancing rapidly into Arnhem and seizing the road and the railway bridges over the river. At the same time part of the 1st Airlanding Brigade, Divisional Headquarters and as many supporting troops as could be fitted in would land by glider in the area immediately North West of Wolfheze Station.

The task of the Airlanding Brigade was to secure the dropping and landing zones for the second lift on the next day. The supporting troops consisted of parts of the Divisional Artillery both field and anti-tank guns, Engineers, and the Divisional Reconnaissance Regiment with a proportion of Administrative troops. To lift the lst Parachute Brigade and this force 161 parachute aircraft of the U.S. 9th Troop Carrier Command and 297 gliders and tug aircraft of 38 and 46 Groups RAF were required.

In the second lift on the second day would come the 4th Parachute Brigade landing on a dropping zone between Planken Wambuis and the railway, and the remainder of the Airlanding Brigade. They would be carried in 126 parachute aircraft and 305 gliders. A further 35 aircraft would drop supplies at the same time. And on the third day the lst
Polish Parachute Brigade Group were to land South of the main bridge, it being estimated that by that time enemy flak in Arnhem would no longer be operative. They would be carried in 114 parachute aircraft and 45 gliders. At the same time 163 aircraft would drop supplies for the Ist Airborne Division.The task of the Airlanding Brigade, when the landing and dropping zones no longer needed to be secured, the 4th Parachute Brigade and the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade Group was to form a perimeter round Arnhem leaving the Ist Parachute Brigade holding the bridges and in reserve.The sectors to be held by them were respectively West, North and East of the town, the Polish Parachute Brigade crossing the river on arrival to reach their sector.

The day selected for the operation was Sunday, 17th September, 1944. The weather was fine and the flight from England uneventful. Landings commenced at one o'clock in the afternoon, were most succesful and accomplished practically without opposition, the troops being enthusiastically received by the local population. Within two and a half hours of the start of the landings, battalions of the 1st Parachute Brigade had started their advance to capture the bridges, and by half past eight that evening after overcoming and bypassing a certain amount of opposition the 2nd Parachute Battalion under command of Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Frost had captured the north end of the main road bridge. One company of this Battalion had been detached to capture the railway bridge, but this was blown up as they arrived at it. Thereafter the company were surrounded, forced to break out and were never able to reform and join their Battalion at the main bridge. The major part of the Headquarters of the 1st Parachute Brigade however reached the bridge later that night. Unfortunately they were without their commander, Brigadier Lathbury, who with General Urquhart had been visiting the 3rd Parachute Battalion and had been forced by enemy activity to remain with it. This Battalion and the lst Parachute Battalion had also both advanced eastwards, the former to support the advance of the 2nd Parachute Battalion and the latter to seize certain high ground north of Arnhem so as to deny the enemy observation on the town of Arnhem. Both these attacks met with serious and increasing resistance, which held up this advance. During the night and morning of the 18th September, determined efforts were made by both battalions to advance, and some progress was made despite heavy casualties, a position near the St. Elizabeth Hospital being reached. On the 17th September the remainder of the troops in the first lift had acomparatively quiet night. Early on the morning of the 18th enemy activity in the area of the dropping and landing zones increased and at the same time, though information was very scanty, it was clear that all was not well with the 1st Parachute Brigade. Brigadier Hicks, who had by now taken over command in the absence of General Urquhart, decided to reinforce the Ist Parachute Brigade immediately, and on the arrival of the second lift to divert part of the 4th Parachute Brigade to this task also. The latter were due to start landing at ten o'clock on the morning of the 18th, but due to the weather in England their take-off was delayed, and they did not start dropping until about three o'clock in the afternoon. Although there was more opposition than on the previous day, the landings were carried out south of "Planken Wambuis" very satisfactorily.

By the evening of the 18th September the situation was as follows: 2nd Parachute Battalion with certain other elements holding firm on the north end of the Arnhem Bridge; the other two Battalions of the 1st Parachute Brigade trying to break through in the general area of the St. Elizabeth Hospital and De Brink. On their way to join them were the 2nd Battalion, The South Staffordshire Regiment of the 1st Airlanding Brigade and the 11th Parachute Battalion of the 4th Parachute Brigade, with a view to a further attack being made on the 19th. The rest of the 4th Parachute Brigade was concentrated in the area of Wolfheze and to the west of it with a view to attacking eastwards along the railway.Unfortunately on the 19th neither the 4th Parachute Brigade nor the force trying to break through to the bridge was successful. As a result General Urquhart, who had by now rejoined his Headquarters in the Hartenstein Hotel, decided after visiting Brigadier Hackett, the Commander of the 4th Parachute Brigade, that this Brigade should disengage from its present position and move south of the railway to an area about the road and railway crossings south of De Koepel, west of De Brink, and at Oosterbeek Laag. It was hoped that it would be possible from this position to develop further operations for the reinforcement of the force holding the bridge.

However the 4th Parachute Brigade were very heavily engaged on the evening of the 19th September in moving south of the railway about Wolfheze and again on the morning of the 20th, when they started their move eastwards. By the end of that day some 200 men, all that were left of that Brigade, which then included the 156th and 10th Parachute Battalions, had assembled in the Hartenstein area and were placed in position covering the approaches to Hartenstein along the main road from Arnhem. In the meanwhile all efforts on the 19th September to reach the bridge had failed and the remnants of the 1st, 3rd and 11th Parachute Battalions and of the 2nd Battalion The South Staffordshire Regiment had reassembled in the area of Oosterbeek Church, where they were reorganized into a composite force by Major Lonsdale of the 11th Parachute Battalion, this force thereafter being known as Lonsdale Force.

On the bridge at Arnhem on the 19th and 20th the defenders were continually attacked, shelled and mortared. The houses which they were holding were set on fire, food and ammunition ran low, and the numbers of wounded continually mounted. Nevertheless the position was still held. However by the evening of the 20th nearly all the houses held had been set on fire and there was nowhere to put the wounded. During the night enemy infiltration made the position worse. At five o'clock on the morning of the 21st an attempt to retake some houses failed and it was clear that the end had come. Those remaining split into small parties and tried to break out. All opposition at the bridge now ceased. The task of the lst Parachute Brigade had been to seize and hold this bridge. Those who reached it did this for nearly four days under continual attack and fire and against increasing and ultimately overwhelming odds. At nine o'clock on the morning of the 21st September, Generaal Urquhart held a conference at his Headquarters to organize a defensive perimeter of those troops that remained. These were divided into two forces, one under Brigadier Hicks, the other under Brigadier Hackett. They were to hold a position with its base on the river Rhine, and running from the area of Oosterbeek Church northwards across the main road to Arnhem to the neighbourhood of Graftombe, thence its western flank passed a few hundred yards west of the Hartenstein Hotel to Heveadorp. This position during the battle did contract and individual enemy troops were to infiltrate into, but despite intense German efforts it never gave way.

It is now necessary to recount the activities of the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade Group. Its anti-tank battery had landed in gliders in the midst of the battle on the 18th and 19th September and been absorbed into the Division. Because of the altered course of the events, the Brigade itself could not be dropped on the 19th September as planned. It was clear also that it could not carry out its original task of landing south of the main Arnhem bridge, crossing it and occupying a position east of Arnhem. A dropping zone was therefore selected for the Poles east and north-east of Driel on which they landed on the evening of 21st September with the task of holding a firm bridgehead on the south bank of the river in that area. That night their patrols found that the Heveadorp ferry had been sunk and that the north bank of the river at that point was in enemy hands, Meantime during the 20th and 21st enemy attacks on the Divisional perimeter had been continuous and the whole area was being submitted to an intense bombardment by every kind of shell, mortar and bomb the enemy possessed. Hand to hand fighting with enemy infantry and close range engagements with enemy gun and flamethrowing tanks were frequent occurrences. It was imperative that if the British Second Army were to take advantage of this small remaining bridgehead on the north bank of the river they should do so immediately. Reinforcement of the perimeter was also essential if it was to remain of sufficient size to cover a crossing of the river in force. However it was only by the night of 20th September that a gallant operation by the British Guards Armoured Division and the American 82nd Airborne Division had succeeded in capturing the bridge at Nymegen, and despite all efforts made it was not until the evening of the 23rd September that the 43rd British Infantry Division succeeded in reaching the south bank of the river west of Driel in force. They were too late for any major crossing to be attempted that night.

Nevertheless efforts had been made on the night of the 22nd September to get as many of the Polish Parachute Brigade as possible across the river from south to north. As a result of enemy action and a shortage of boats or rafts only some 50 men got over. The following night the Polish Parachute Brigade again tried to cross the river in force and, after many casualties, they ferried over a further 200 officers and men. On the nigth of the 24th September the 4th Battalion The Dorset Regiment of the 43rd British Infantry Division made a very gallant attempt to cross the river led by their Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel G. Tilly. The landings were very scattered owing to enemy fire and the swift river current, and the battalion was never able to concentrate on landing. This was, however, a very brave and determined effort to come to the rescue of the 1st Airborne Division. By the morning of the 25th September it was clear to General Urquhart, the landings during the previous night having failed, that heavy casualties, fatigue, and lack of ammunition, food and water were exercising an increasing effect on the defenders of the perimeter and that further strong enemy offensive action might cause its defences to disintegrate. It was at this time that a message was received from 2nd Army stating the possibility of the withdrawal of the lst Airborne Division southwards across the river. General Urquhart immediately replied that if this withdrawal was to be carried out, it must be done on the night of the 25th September and no later. A signal confirming that the withdrawal would be that night was soon after received.

Enemy action during the 25th September was fortunately less intense than on previous days, and by ten o'clock that night the withdrawal began in a storm of wind and rain and strong artillery and machinegun support from the south bank of the river, which all helped to deaden sounds of movement. By dawn on the morning of the 26th approximately 1700 men of the 1st Airborne Division together with about 420 pilots had been ferried across the river, 300 men remaining on the north bank, all who could swim having already done so. These were all that remained from a force of 10.000 men.

Thus ended the Battle for Arnhem, but no account of it would be complete without mention of the heroic efforts made during the battle by the Royal Air Force and the United States Air Force to supply the lst Airborne Division with ammunition, food, and other supplies by air, by the medical services in their treatment of the wounded, and by the local population by the information they gave, their efforts to succour the wounded and aid the escape of those left behind. The Royal Air Force had to contend with bad weather, intense opposition from fighters and flak and lack of exact knowledge of where to drop supplies, the planned dropping zones not being in the Division's hands. No wonder that much of the supplies dropped fell into enemy hands, but if ever men of the 1st Airborne Division needed inspiration it was provided by the sight of the supply dropping aircraft flying straight and level through the flak, and continuing to do so even when on fire until they had dropped their supplies.

The medical services of the Division had early in the battle taken over part of the Municipal hospital at Arnhem. This hospital had however by the 20th September fallen into enemy hands. The Germans however permitted the British medical personnel in the Municipal Hospital to continue the work of tending the casualties there. Much assistance was rendered by the Dutch staff of the hospital, both doctors and nurses, until this was stopped by the Germans. Other dressing stations were formed in Oosterbeek and at the Divisional Headquarter at the Hartenstein Hotel. Later, after the battle, the medical personnel of the Division were evacuated with the casualties to Apeldoorn. The majority became prisoners, but some, including Brigadier Hackett, who had been seriously wounded during the battle, and Colonel Warrack, the Chief Medical Officer of the Division, succesfully escaped. Many others including Brigadier Lathbury were concealed and fed by the local population, while arrangements for their escape were made. No praise can be too high for all those Dutch men and women who risked their lives in this way. Within a month of the withdrawal of the Division a party of 120 officers and men had crossed the river in a body. Thereafter escaping became much more difficult but for a considerable period odd groups of men continued to infiltrate across the river into the British lines.

In conclusion, it is necessary to sum up the results of this battle. In the opinion of Field-Marshall Montgomery the action of the British 1st Airborne Division against overwhelming odds held off reinforcements from Nijmegen and vitally contributed to the capture of the bridge there. On this account alone the considered that the battle had been ninety percent succesful. Finally in a letter to General Urquhart written on the 28th September 1944 he said as follows: ,In the annals of the British Army there are many glorious deeds. In our Army we have always drawn great strength and inspiration from past traditions, and endeavoured to live up to the high standards of those who have gone before. But there can be few episodes more glorious than the epic of Arnhem, and those that follow after will find it hard to live up to the high standards that you have set. So long as we have in the armies of the British Empire, officers and men who will do as you have done, then we can indeed look forward with complete confidence to the future.