The Pacific

The Battle of Tarawa

Sat, 20 Nov 1943 19:07:23 +0100

THE ROAD TO TARAWA
At the Quebec conference in August of 1943, the Allied high command announced it's intention to launch an offensive in the Central Pacific, in the drive towards Japan. A prime objective of this drive, to be undertaken as a Navy-Marines operation, was to take the Marshall Islands. The Marshall Islands would serve as an air base from which further operations could be launched against the Marianas, and from there against the Japanese home islands. But 500 miles to the southeast of the Marshalls, an archipelago of atolls called the Gilberts stood between U.S. forward ground air bases and the Marshalls. The Gilberts had only one workable airstrip for refueling American aircraft and that was on the island of Betio in the western Gilbert Island atoll of Tarawa. The Japanese commander in charge of the defense of Tarawa, Rear Admiral Keiji Shibasaki, said "A mission men cannot take Tarawa in a hundred years." He commanded 2,600 imperial marines, the best amphibious troops in the Japanese armed forces. With the importation of 1,000 Japanese workers and 1,200 Korean laborers the island airstrip of Betio had been transformed into one of the most formidable fortresses in the world, boasting 14 coastal defense guns(four of which were taken from the surrendered British garrison at Singapore), 40 strategically located artillery pieces, covering every approach to the island, a coconut-log sea wall four feet high lining the lagoon and over 100 machine gun emplacements behind the wall. All this was concentrated on an island only a mile long and a few hundred yards wide. Meanwhile an armada of 17 carriers, 12 battleships, eight heavy and four light cruisers, 66 destroyers and 36 transports carrying the 2nd Marine Division and a part of the 37th Infantry Division- some 35,000 soldiers and Marines headed for Betio in early November of 1943. In the moments before pre-invasion bombardment began, the task force naval commander, Rear Admiral Howard F. Kingman announced to the landing troops "Gentlemen, we will not neutralize Betio. We will not destroy it. We will obliterate it!" Neither Shibasaki nor Kingman knew what they were up against.

NOVEMBER 20: D-DAY
On November 20th at 2:15 A.M. the marine transports went to General Quarters. Last minute landing preparations were made and the marines received their last rites. At 5:05 A.M. the first battleship let loose a salvo on Betio's coastal batteries, followed shortly thereafter by the other battleships and destroyers in the task force. The shelling stopped only for enough time to let the dive bombers from the escort carriers pound the island. The first wave of amphtracks and Higgins boats moved in on the lagoon side of Betio. The formation was jolted to a stop 500 yards out by a reef which the amphtracks could climb over only with great difficulty. Simultaneously, a hail of fire opened up from the island, incinerating the lodged and incoming boats as well as mowing down the marines wading ashore. Few of the first wave survived. But a few got through, and with the help of four successive waves the marines established a beachhead up to a four foot sea wall. By nightfall, the marines were pinned down on a stretch of beach 100 yards long and 20 feet inland. And rather than being obliterated, the Japanese marines had barely been scratched by the naval and air bombardment. While a brief respite between bombardment and the landings had occurred, the Japanese rushed to their gun posts and had delivered devastating fire. But because their communication lines had been cut, none of them knew what was going on. Therefore, according tot the Bushido Code, each isolated soldier or group of soldiers was obliged to either fight to the death or commit suicide unless ordered otherwise. Consequently, Japanese resistance was fanatical. Some Japanese swam out to disabled amphtracks that night and poured fire onto the marines from the rear- silenced only at great cost to the marines. And a lone Japanese seaplane-turned-bomber easily inflicted casualties on the concentrated beachhead. In all, the first day on Betio had been very costly for the 2nd Division- amphtracks and Higgins boats littered the lagoon, wounded marines everywhere, and dead bodies and parts of bodies everywhere: out of 5,000 men, 1,500 were dead or wounded.

NOVEMBER 21: THE SECOND DAY
At the beginning of the second day, three marine battalions held a small foothold on Betio's lagoon beach. They were ordered to attack at 6:00 A.M. while the 2nd Division reserves, the 1st and 3rd battalions of the Eighth Marines were brought up to the reef. As the Japanese defenders opened up on the wading-in marines, Colonel Shoup of Major Crowe's battalion at the far east side of the lagoon ordered a desperate attack to halt the slaughter of incoming marines. Only 450 of the 800 incoming men made it to the beach. But with this fresh reserve, the central battalion punched its way inland, across the airstrip, and seized a part of the island's sough shore. Meanwhile a high tide flooded the lagoon, allowing reinforcement boats to pass over the reef and come directly up to shore. The arrival of tanks in support of all three battalions on the beachheads proved critical that day. The tanks rolled up to the front lines, taking out Japanese pill boxes and other fortifications at close range. By dusk, the 6th Marines, after having secured the nearby island of Makin, paddled over the reef in rubber boats and landed on the western beach. There, they met up with Major Ryan's ravaged western lagoon assault battalion. Reinforced, and having gained ground, the second day came to an end. Marine Colonel Shoup radioed the daily situation report back to the command ships: "Casualties: many. Percentage dead: unknown. Combat efficiency: we are winning." Meanwhile, Admiral Shibasaki was sending his last radio message to Tokyo: "Our weapons have been destroyed. From now on everyone is attempting a final charge. May Japan exist for ten thousand years!"

NOVEMBER 22: THE THIRD DAY
On the third day, all three battalions moved inland, with the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines sweeping up the southern shore of Betio. With infantry and flame thrower support, tanks blew apart the remaining fortifications in the central and western part of the island. Taking out pill boxes, machine gun nests and snipers took up much of this third day. But by nightfall, the marines held western and central Betio. At twilight, Shibasaki's troops made one final courageous 'Banzai' suicide charge. They rushed the 6th Marines, Company B in almost overpowering numbers. The marines began to break. Lieutenant Thomas phoned Major Jones, saying "We are killing them as fast as they come at us, but we can't hold much longer; we need reinforcements." Jones replied, "We haven't got them to send you; you've got to hold." In the face of heavy losses, the 6th Marines wavered, but didn't break. When dawn appeared, the marines still held their positions.

NOVEMBER 23: THE FINAL ACT
On the morning of November 23rd, the 6th Marines counted 300 Japanese bodies scattered around their positions. As it turned out, this group of Japanese had been the last large contingent on Betio with only small pockets of resistance remaining. And following a painstaking mop up of the eastern side of the island, Japanese resistance, with the exception of a few snipers who would continue to take pot shots at marines for the next several days, came to an end. For at 1:12 P.M., after 76 hours of fighting, Betio was declared 'secure'. Upon arriving at Betio that day, General Holland Smith ordered both the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack to be raised over Betio(for Betio was to revert to the British as a Pacific trust after the war). The general then toured the island west of the airport. He noted that only seventeen Japanese had surrendered while only 129 Korean laborers had survived out of a total of 4,700 troops and construction workers.

THE VALUE OF TARAWA
In the 76-hour fight for Betio, 1,056 marines and sailors were killed, died of wounds or were missing and presumed to be dead. Some 2,300 men were wounded, but recovered. Meanwhile, at home, Americans were appalled by the losses at Tarawa, flooding Admiral Nimitz's mail with angry letters. But Tarawa had taught the navy and the marines some vital lessons in amphibious warfare which in the near future, would save thousands of lives. More amphtracks were to be built with better armor, including side protection for marines. Higgins boats were removed from landing operations. Landing craft were converted into supporting gunboats, able to come in close on the beach. Underwater demolition teams were organized to destroy natural and artificial obstacles before future atoll landing would take place. Precision rocket and naval attacks had proven their worth against the near impregnable fortifications. And the role of the tank in turning the tide of battle proved critical. All these lessons would be applied to future campaigns with great success. The price for Betio had been relatively high, but within days, Betio was converted into a forward base for the assault on the Marshalls, with bomber and fighter sorties flying out within hours of the marines victory. And within nine weeks of the battle, an invasion task force under Admiral Nimitz left Tarawa to take the Marshall Islands.

The Battle of the Coral Sea

Tue, 7 Apr 1942 21:50:46 +0200

April 7, 1942
Lieutenant Kiyoshinge Sato of the Imperial Japanese Army left Rabaul, on the northern tip of New Britain Island in the Coral Sea, for the interior of Talasea. His mission was to make sure that no wireless stations were left on the island, allowing the Imperial Army to launch an amphibious assault from Rabaul against Port Moresby in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, beginning in Tulagi. The invasion of Port Moresby was a stepping stone to attack northern Australia, knocking out her air power. The Imperial Army was convinced of its absolute supremacy in the war of the Pacific. After the strike at Pearl Harbor, the flag of the Rising Sun had obtained easy captures of Singapore, Hong Kong, the Philippines and Java and Sumatra. The Western fleets had been crippled, and the Japanese military term "hakko ichiu", to bring all the corners of the world under common Japanese control, seemed possible.
April 8, 1942
Japanese Plan
The Japanese took Talasea. Imperial Headquarters planned to take Port Moresby, the big Australian air base in New Guinea, and Tulagi in the Solomon Islands, where a sea plane base could then be built. The invasion would give Japan control of the Coral Sea and afford easy access to Northern Australia, where Allied buildup could be observed.
Mid-April, 1942
MacArthur's Plan
General Douglas MacArthur's intelligence units in Australia were keeping Admiral Nimitz and his staff, stationed at Pearl Harbor, informed of Japanese movement around Tulagi and Rabaul. MacArthur had a huge stake in the safety of Port Moresby. His plan was to move his troops back up the island chains, establishing Port Moresby as a stepping stone northwest to the Philippines as soon as possible.
April 30, 1942
Japanese intelligence found that the Americans had 200 first-line fighter planes in Australia. After five months of war,losing only a handful of ships, Japan had no fear. The Japanese Port Moresby attack was called Operation MO. The landbased air force consisted of 150 planes, the carrier striking force had heavy cruisers Myoko and Haguro, six destroyers, an oiler and the two big carriers, Shokaku and Zuikaku which had participated in the raid on Pearl Harbor. The invasion force for Tulagi had six destroyers, which covered eleven transports, a number of converted minesweepers, two oilers and a repair ship, protected by a pair of light cruisers. The plan was to invade Tulagi on May 3, and Port Moresby on May 10. During this time, American intelligence "Magic", for the first significant time in the Pacific war, knew that the Japanese were moving air power down from the Marianas and the Marshall Islands. Air attacks on Port Moresby and Tulagi were impending. All signs pointed to a major military operation to begin from the Rabaul area around the first of May. Admiral Nimitz knew that the carriers Zuikaku and Shokaku were in the Rabaul area and that the Japanese were amassing ships there. The American Pacific Fleet stood ready and alert, at the command of Admiral Nimitz. On this date, the Americans were already moving 22,000 Army troops to New Caledonia, South of the Solomon Islands. North of New Caledonia, Efate in the New Hebrides Islands was occupied with several New Zealand warships and a handful of American destroyers. The Japanese had anticipated that they would have some kind of naval battle before the Port Moresby landing. Their intelligence showed one American carrier in the area, they thought it was Saratoga, it was Fletcher's Yorktown. Admiral Inouye planned to entice the American naval units into the Coral Sea, and catch them in a pincers between the light carrier Shoho and its cruisers on one side, and the two fleet carriers, cruisers and destroyers on the other. Nimitz was not to be caught napping. Admiral Fitch and his carrier Lexington were told to rendezvous with Admiral Fletcher and his carrier Yorktown west of the New Hebrides islands. MacArthur's navy and Rear Admiral J.G. Crace of the Royal Navy would contribute several cruisers. To these were added the American cruiser Chicago and the destroyer Perkins. Admiral Halsey and his two carriers were due in any day from the Tokyo raid; however, they might not make it in time. Nimitz was sure that Fletcher would find a battle in the Coral Sea.
May 1, 1942
The Australians knew that Japanese were headed to Tulagi, and they withdrew their small garrison before the Japanese arrival on May 3rd. The task forces of Admiral Fitch and Admiral Crace joined up with Admiral Fletcher west of the New Hebrides islands in the Coral Sea. Fletcher, commander of Cruisers of the Pacific Fleet, viewed the aircraft carrier as primarily a ship which carried airplanes, but still a surface ship with fighting power. He was of the old school, those who viewed the carrier as a ship that needed fuel and must be ready to move in a moments notice. Fuelling and provisions were on his mind at all times. The ships assembled and stood by for fuelling to prepare for action; however, the great Battle of the Coral Sea was to be the first naval engagement in history in which surface ships did not exchange a shot. Dive bombers and torpedo bombers launched from carriers was the new face of battle.
May 2, 1942
MacArthur reported that the enemy was moving toward Tulagi. Fletcher hurriedly broke from the group, leaving Fitch and his force still fuelling. Fletcher rushed toward the Solomons to see what he could do. He worried that the Japanese might know that he was in the area because his scout planes had spotted and bombed a Japanese submarine the night before. Fletcher was lucky. That night when his eleven ships headed for the Solomons, the bad weather masked his presence.
May 3, 1942
The Japanese settled into Tulagi with no opposition, getting ready to build a seaplane base for the future. Construction troops with equipment went ashore and the Japanese chalked up another easy victory. Fletcher was in the middle of the Coral Sea. He fueled again. His destroyers were standing by the oiler Neosho and topping off, one after the other, even as the Japanese soldiers, in their gray and green tropical uniforms, piled through the surf to the beach at Tulagi. At 7:00 that night, news of the Tulagi invasion reached Fletcher. The American force was badly fragmented. Fitch and Crace were heading for the rendezvous point 300 miles south of Guadalcanal island. Fletcher was alone, 100 miles off Guadalcanal, unready for any serious Japanese opposition. The loss of surprise that Fletcher had counted on seemed the worst thing that could happen.
May 4, 1942
Yorktown began launching planes into the rain squalls and winds of up to 35 knots. Waves of American dive bombers attacked Tulagi in the early morning. The Japanese gunners were inexperienced and their heavy fire proved inaccurate. The Japanese ships began to move out, heading north, back to Rabaul and safety. Three Japanese seaplanes took to the air. Fletcher sent four of the fighters of the second strike air cover group to knock but the seaplanes. All three seaplanes were shot down. The Americans had met the enemy in open battle for the first time, they had missed a great deal due to the fogging of the windshields of the bombers, but they believed they had sunk two destroyers, a freighter, four gunboats, beached a light cruiser, and damaged another destroyer, a freighter, and a seaplane. The battle felt good.
May 5, 1942
Fletcher's Yorktown force steamed to meet up with Fitch's Lexington force and Admiral Crace's support group three hundred miles south of the Solomons. Two Yorktown fighter pilots had gone down and been rescued, and a ditched torpedo bomber had produced no survivors. It was time to regroup. That night, Fletcher refuelled, and then headed northwest, estimating that any force preparing to attack Port Moresby would steam down from Rabaul. Fletcher was a clever seaman, but his primary aim was to continually prepare his ship for the onslaught of battle. While seemingly a logical desire, Fletcher would later undergo criticism as a result of his continual preparedness. In Washington, Admiral King berated Fletcher for fiddling around when he should have been hitting the Japanese harder. One month later, in the Battle of Midway, this criticism would come to fruition when Fletcher's deficiencies would cause him the loss of Yorktown and to be replaced by a younger seaman.
May 6, 1942
The Japanese sent a scout seaplane to confirm that an American force was moving northward. Aboard the carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku the Japanese pilots were eager to battle to Americans; for six months they had been waiting to destroy the American carriers. The Japanese had become contemptuous of the weakling westerners. Their conquests thus far had been made with ease, and they considered no type of secret occupation of Operation MO. The enemies were heading toward each other. Fletcher sent the oil tanker Neosho away from the Pacific fleet, with escort destroyer Sims, to be available in case they needed more fuel.
May 7, 1942
6 A.M.  Zuikaku's planes were sent to search one area behind the Japanese carrier force, and Shokaku's planes were sent to search another area behind, to make sure that the Americans had not circled around and come up in the rear of the Japanese covering force.  7:30 A.M.  The Japanese searchers in the eastern section of the zone spotted ships on the water. Japanese bombers began to close in. The ships were not the American carriers, but destroyer Sims and oiler Neosho. Lookouts on the Neosho spotted two planes, but assumed they were American planes checking on the safety of the oiler and her escort.  8 A.M.  A Yorktown search pilot reported that he had found two carriers and four heavy cruisers. In response, the Lexington launched two fighters, 28 dive bombers and a dozen torpedo bombers, headed for the enemy 175 miles away on the northeast side of the Louisiade island group. Admiral Fitch committed his force, leaving only eight dive bombers on the carrier for anti- torpedo plane patrol. The report was in error. Two old light cruisers, a seaplane carrier, and three converted gunboats were what the search pilot had seen. Yorktown's search missed the Japanese fleet carriers altogether.  8:30 A.M.  The fliers of Lexington and Yorktown, 93 in all, faced 9 fighters that the Japanese were able to throw into the air to defend the mistaken fleet. The Americans soon discovered strange defensive devices unknown previously: the Japanese planes were all equipped with smoke-making devices, so they emitted smoke when in a tight spot, causing their attackers to drop away. Another important discovery was made that day, the Japanese Zero's maneuverability was partly because of its light weight; however, the Zero pilot had no armored seat or even a self- sealing fuel tank. One well-placed burst of machine gun fire could kill the pilot or set the plane on fire. The worst discovery made that day was that the American TBD torpedo bomber was agonizingly slow. Dive bombers were always miles ahead, and had to wait for the back-up torpedo planes. The circling dive bombers alerted the enemy, and if forced to go in alone, the full force of the high-low attack was severely weakened. Just a month later this slowness would prove fatal. In the Battle of Midway, the entire Torpedo 8 squadron, flying TBD's, would be slaughtered by zero's while attacking the Japanese carriers.  9:20 A.M.  The Japanese light carrier, Shoho, was bombed and torpedoed from one end to the other. She was sinking. Six Shoho Zeros were still in the air. Two American fighters fell, and three of the six Japanese fighters were shot down, as well as the land- based scout plane that had come to help them. American fighters had been warned not to try to "dog-fight" with the more maneuverable Zero's, but to fly high, forcing the Zero's to waste fuel in an attempt to chase the Americans. The Americans were jubilant. An America hard-pressed by a dismal succession of nightmare stories of surrenders in the Philippines, battles lost, and great ships sacrificed, was to hear the statement that would thrill a nation. R.E. Dixon, second in command of Lexington's dive bombers shouted into his microphone, "Dixon to carrier. Scratch one flattop," referring to the carrier Shoho. Admirals Fletcher and Fitch, fed information from Nimitz and MacArthur's intelligence, knew that the main battle had not yet even begun.  12:09 P.M.  Sims took her first direct hit. In a half hour Sims was going down. Neosho, known as "The Fat Lady," shot down one of the Japanese dive bombers. The bomber pilot dove his plane for the deck, starting a flash fire which spread across the starboard side. Men from Sims were trying to get to Neosho, while many of Neosho's men were panicking and abandoning ship to the life rafts. Classified material was hurriedly destroyed. The Japanese were long gone as the rafts from Neosho were inflated and set afloat. No one knew how many men had leaped after them.  5:00 P.M.  As night fell, the enemy fleet groups were nearing each other. So far, the Americans had erroneously attacked what they thought was the Imperial Fleet, and the Japanese had attacked an oiler and her escort. The Americans backed off, Admiral Fletcher headed southeast to wait for morning before attempting to continue the battle. The Japanese considered a night attack before heading north. Their mission was not to destroy the American fleet, but to cover the Port Moresby invasion force. The crew of Neosho and those who had survived the attack on Sims were quiet while they waited for rescuers. Neosho had not gone down. Her position was frantically given by the navigator before all power was lost. Whaleboats filled with the crew rode the heavy sea, battling constantly to keep themselves from drifting from the side of Neosho.
May 8, 1942
5:30 A.M.  The American shore-based aircraft had not sighted the Japanese carriers. Admiral Fitch, appointed to tactical control of the mission, launched a search of every one of the three hundred and sixty degrees around the Pacific Fleet's location.  8:23 A.M.  The American task force had been sighted by the Japanese, who had been searching as hard for the enemy as had Fitch's pilots. The Japanese force had the luck of the weather on this fateful day, they hid under cloud cover. The Americans were in bright sunlight. The massive fleets would meet at last, and for the first time ever, carriers would fight carriers.  9:24 A.M.  Yorktown launched 24 dive bombers, six fighters, and nine torpedo bombers. Lexington launched a comparable force ten minutes later. The day had formally begun. The cream of the American crop was meeting the cream of the Japanese crop. The pilots of Shokaku and Zuikaku were the most experienced of the war, they had participated in the raid on Pearl Harbor. Each force found the others mother ships, separated by 175 miles of sea, and delivered fierce attacks, far out of sight of their commanders.  11:40 A.M.  Yorktown's pilots severely damaged Shokaku. 100 of her crew were dead, 50 wounded. Shokaku was one of Japan's beloved immense carriers. She and Zuikaku were licking their battle wounds at home during the Battle of Midway. Had these veteran carriers been present for that decisive battle, Admiral Yamamoto might have won, changing the entire course of events in the war of the Pacific.
The Day Battle
The Japanese Zero's and torpedo planes kept incessantly attacking the carrier Lexington. She was unlucky that day. Initially on takeoff one of the four fighters assigned to the protection of the dive bombers ran into the tail of another plane. Three more fighters got lost, and her torpedo squadron wasted valuable time flying around, failing to find the enemy. In the end, her few fighters were low on fuel and facing 20 Zero's. The Zero's took them down one by one. The carrier Yorktown was lightly damage. She had taken a great number of hits, but was salvageable. Her six months of repair work would be completed in three days at Pearl Harbor. She would fight in the Battle of Midway. The Battle of the Coral Sea had taken place completely in and from the air. Torpedo planes dropped their blasts on enemy carriers while defensive planes and support ships fired on the enemy. It was the first Naval battle in which no ship on either side ever sighted the other. It went on all day. American estimates were conservative. It was believed that one Japanese carrier had been damaged, but that the Japanese were still ready to battle. The Japanese, however, believed that they had won. They reported that two American carriers had definitely been sunk. In the first big carrier battle in the Pacific War and in all of history, the Japanese had tested their ability against that of the Americans, and they had prevailed.  2:47 P.M.  One of the Japanese torpedoes that had hit the Lexington had actually ruptured a number of her gasoline tanks. Gasoline vapor seeped out of the bulging tanks. The generator room was a huge bomb waiting to explode. When it did blow, all communication was cut off and the Air Department of the ship continued to land its planes. Damage control parties were trying to stop the fire as the temperature jumped to 150 degrees.  4:00 P.M.  Lexington asked Yorktown to land her 14 remaining planes still circling in the air. All personnel were shifted to the aft of the carrier.  4:30 P.M.  All positions were abandoned, the ship lost all power. She was dead in the water.  4:35 P.M.  The three destroyers Anderson, Hammann, and Morris circled the Lexington. Cruisers Minneapolis and New Orleans stood by to help if the great ship went down.  5:07 P.M.  Admiral Fitch called down from the bridge, "Let's get the men off," this was the order to abandon ship. By 6:00 P.M. most of the 1200 officers and men were off the Lexington and aboard the destroyers. The total casualties of the battle against the Japanese and the battle against the sea were 8%. Fitch's decision to abandon the crippled ship was credited with saving some 2700 lives. Even Fitch's dog, wrapped in a life jacket, was rescued by one of the U.S. ships standing by.  6:10 P.M.  The order to put an end to the Lexington rang out in the dark night. Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid said, "Detail one DD to sink Lexington with torpedoes, then rejoin promptly." The Lexington was bombed. She was a major loss for the Americans in the Battle of the Coral Sea. Believing that the Pacific Fleet had won a glorious victory over the Japanese, the Americans sadly watched the Lexington go down in her hour of glory. Flames slashed through the growing darkness. Admiral Fletcher willed her quick demise, worried at the thought of the Lexington as a propaganda prize for the Japanese if she continued to float. She did not.  Nightfall  With the death of the Lexington, Admiral Fletcher had been undecided whether or not he should stage a night attack against the Japanese. The answer came from Admiral Nimitz in Pearl Harbor, ordering Fletcher to retire from the Coral Sea. The fleet moved southward unaware how close they were to the wreck of Neosho and her desperately waiting survivors. Admiral Inouye at Rabaul postponed the Port Moresby invasion indefinitely. Without Shoho and the badly injured Shokaku, he could not risk it. When Admiral Yamamoto, Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet, learned of Inouye's decision, he was furious. He ordered Admiral Takagi to return to the Coral Sea and wipe out the American forces immediately. Takagi headed back.Admiral Fletcher was still ready to fight. The "New York Times" had called the battle a great American victory, estimating that 17 out of 22 Japanese ships were sunk. Fletcher's estimate was two destroyers, three cargo ships, four gunboats, one light cruiser, one light carrier, various gunboats and other small craft, and one light cruiser that had beached itself. The carrier Zuikaku had been slightly damaged, as well as one destroyer, another heavy cruiser, and the carrier Shokaku. Three torpedo bombers off Port Moresby and five sea planes, three patrol bombers, seven fighters, and fourteen torpedo bombers in the air had all been destroyed. In all, 144 Japanese planes and 5100 Japanese. Fletcher knew what the American losses were: one carrier, one destroyer and one tanker sunk, and one carrier damaged. Fifteen Lexington planes had been lost in combat, and 35 had gone down with the ship. Sixteen Yorktown planes had been lost in combat. In all, the Americans had lost 66 planes and an estimated 543 men. Admiral Takagi was searching for the Americans in the southern waters, but he turned southwest, which took him in the opposite direction. Both Takagi and Fletcher would be eclipsed at the Battle of Midway. Yamamoto blamed the failure of a decisive Japanese victory on Takagi, as Admiral King had blamed Fletcher.
Midnight
The American destroyer Henley unknowingly headed for Neosho. The men of the oil tanker, along with the survivors of her escort, Sims, had struggled to hold on for two long nights and days. Just when the Henley was almost upon the Neosho, a report that an enemy carrier was just ahead, caused the Commander to turn away to miss the carrier. The Henley moved back from the Neosho at fifteen knots.
May 10, 1942
12:30 P.M.  Slowly, the Neosho was sinking. It was time to abandon ship. Funeral services for the dead and passing food and supplies to the men in the surrounding whaleboats had been taken care of. A buzzing from the sky could be heard. An Australian Hudson was spotted. The men prayed that the Australian would communicate with MacArthur, and he with Pearl Harbor, so they would finally be rescued.  Afternoon  The destroyer Henley had turned around and was once again steaming toward the last reported position of Neosho at twenty knots.  Nightfall  Despair plagued the men of Neosho once again. They did not know if the ship would hold up through the night. The men aboard the rafts were dying one by one. There was no reason why the Task Force should not have reached them by this time, unless the wrong position was given by her navigator.
May 11, 1942
1:23 P.M.  The Henley at last reached Neosho. 109 survivors of Neosho and 14 survivors of Sims went aboard. 21 men had died. Neosho was unsalvageable, and was bombed and sunk by Henley at 2:28 P.M. On the face of it, the Battle of the Coral Sea appeared to be a victory for the Japanese. The Imperial Navy had sunk one American fleet carrier and damaged another, sunk an oiler and a destroyer, while losing only Shoho and a large number of planes, and suffering severe damage to Shokaku and enough damage to Zuikaku to keep both out of the war for several months. It was a tactical victory for the Imperial forces. However, the battle was a strategic victory for the Americans. The Coral Sea meant the end of Japanese expansion southward. They would never again threaten Australia and New Zealand. The significance of the Battle of the Coral Sea was that the Americans had foiled the occupation of Port Moresby and the knockout of Australian air power. These were necessary before carrier strikes by the Japanese against Australia. In a few weeks the Americans would land on Guadalcanal, and the Japanese would eventually be driven out of the Solomon Islands after months of attrition warfare. There would be no more expansion, bases, or victories for Japan. Although both forces withdrew simultaneously, the Japanese had two less carriers for the Battle of Midway, and erroneously believed that the Americans had lost the Yorktown. Just as important was Admiral Yamamoto's determination to wipe out the American Fleet in the wake of the Battle of the Coral Sea. The American people must be convinced that the Japanese could not be defeated. Desperate for victory, the Japanese were marching down the road of defeat.

The information in this timeline is from the book "Blue Skies and Blood" by Edwin P. Hoyt.

tora, tora, tora

Sun, 7 Dec 1941 21:45:55 +0200

It was early morning, December 7,1941. As the sun was just beginning to rise in Oahu, Hawaii, a fleet of Japanese naval air forces were taking off from their respective aircraft carriers in various locations in the Pacific Ocean. Just as many of the islanders were waking up for breakfast, it happened. The Japanese air fleet had arrived with a vengeance. No one was prepared for what was occurring. Pearl Harbor, the United States' center for military action in the Pacific Ocean, was almost completely destroyed. Anger toward the Japanese spread quickly throughout the entire
country, and this anger led to the United States' entry into World War II.
EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE BOMBING
Before entering World War II, Japan had many other problems to deal with. It had begun to rely more and more for raw materials (especially oil) from outside sources because their land was so lacking in these. Despite these difficulties, Japan began to build a successful empire with a solid industrial foundation and a good army and navy. The military became highly involved in the government, and this began to get them into trouble. In the early 1930's, the Japanese Army had many small, isolated battles with the Chinese in Manchuria. The Japanese Army prevailed in the series of battles, and Manchuria became a part of the Japanese political system. In 1937, the conflicts began again with the Chinese in the area near Beijing's Marco Polo Bridge. Whether or not these conflicts began inadvertently or whether they were planned is unknown. These led to a full-scale war known as the second Sino-Japanese War. This was one of the bloodiest wars in world history and continued until the final defeat of Japan in 1945.
In 1939, World War II was beginning with a string of victories by German forces. Germany's success included defeats of Poland and France along with a seizure of England. Many of the European nations that Germany now controlled had control over important colonial empires such as the East Indies and Singapore in Southeast Asia. These Southeast Asian countries contained many of the natural resources that Japan so desperately needed. Now that these countries were worried about matters over in Europe, Japan felt that it should seize the opportunity to take over some of them.
At the same time in the United States, President Franklin D. Roosevelt wanted to halt the expansion of Germany and Japan, but many others in the government wanted to leave the situation alone. The United States began to supply materials to the countries at war with Germany and Japan, but it wanted to remain neutral to prevent and overseas war. Meanwhile, Germany, Italy, and Japan formed the Axis Alliance in September of 1940. Japan was becoming desperate for more natural resources. In July of 1941, Japan made the decision to secure access to the abundance of the much needed resources in Southeast Asia. It was afraid that it could not defeat the larger and stronger Western powers. It needed to build up its armies in order to stay in the war. It also had to worry, though. about the United States' reaction to their plans to seize Southeast Asia.
Japan began their seizure with southern Indochina. (They already controlled northern Indochina.) The United States was in strict opposition to Japan's plans, and began their reaction with an embargo on the shipment of oil to Japan. Oil was necessary to keep Japan's technology and military progressing. Without it, Japan's industrial and military forces would come to a stop in only a short time. Japan's government viewed the oil embargo as an act of war.
Throughout the next few months of 1941, the United States tried to come to some kind of resolve with Japan to settle their differences. Japan wanted the United States to lift the oil embargo and allow them to attempt a takeover of China. The United States refused to lift the embargo until Japan would back off of their aggression with China. Neither country would budge on their demands, and war seemed to be inescapable.
The United States regarded Japan's adamant refusal to budge on their stance as a sign of hostility. They too realized that war was inevitable. They responded to this potential war with Japan by adding to the military forces stationed in the Pacific. General Douglas MacArthur and his ground forces in the Philippines began to organize into a formidable army. The B-17 was just arriving at many air force bases throughout the country, and was a great confidence to MacArthur upon its arrival. MacArthur became so confident in his forces stationed in the Philippines that on December 5,1941, he said, "Nothing would please me better than if they would give me three months and then attack here."
The most powerful and most crucial part of American defense in the Pacific Ocean was that of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Usually, this fleet was stationed somewhere along the west coast of the United States, and made a training cruise to Hawaii each year. With war looming, the U.S. Pacific Fleet was moved to the Pearl Harbor naval base in Hawaii. This was the perfect location for the American forces in the Pacific because of its location, halfway between the United States west coast and the Japanese military bases in the Marshall Islands. The Pacific Fleet first arrived at Pearl Harbor naval base on April 2, 1940, and were scheduled to return to the United States mainland around May 9, 1940. This plan was drastically changed because of the increasing activity of Italy in Europe and Japan's attempt at expansion in Southeast Asia. President Roosevelt felt that the presence of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii would retard any Japanese attempt at a strike on the United States. Admiral James O. Richardson of the Pacific Fleet was in full opposition to the long stay at Pearl Harbor. He felt that the facilities were inadequate to maintain the ships or crews. Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, was the one who originally made the decision to extend the crew's stay in Hawaii; and, in spite of Admiral Richardson's complaints, he maintained that the Pacific Fleet must stay there to keep the Japanese from entering the East Indies. Richardson felt that the Japanese would realize the military disadvantages of being stationed at Pearl Harbor, and would be quick to act on the situation. All of Richardson's objections, in meetings with both the Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox and the President, got him nothing but a dismissal shortly thereafter.
On November 12,1940, British torpedo bombers launched an attack on the Taranto harbor in Italy. This sent worry into United States government officials who were afraid that the same thing could happen to Pearl Harbor. On November 22, Admiral Stark suggested to Richardson the idea of placing anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor. Richardson replied that they were neither necessary nor practical. On February 1,1941, Richardson was officially replaced by Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. Kimmel also did not like the idea of his fleet at Pearl Harbor; but, after seeing what had happened to Richardson, he was very quiet about his objections. The Pacific Fleet was to be used as a defensive measure to direct Japan's attention away from Southeast Asia by: (a)capturing the Caroline and Marshall Islands, (b)disrupting Japanese trade routes, and (c)defending Guam, Hawaii, and the United States mainland. Kimmel was supposed to prepare his fleet for war with Japan.
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander-in-chief of Japan's Combined Fleet, had to be careful of his country's position in the Pacific. If he concentrated his forces too much in the Pacific islands, then the mainland would be more susceptible to attack from Europe and even the United States. Yamamoto devised a plan that involved an opening blow to the United States Pacific Fleet at the same time as their offensive against British, American, and Dutch forces in Southeast Asia. He planned to cripple the United States while he quickly conquered much of Southeast Asia and gathered their natural resources. He hoped that his attack against the Pacific Fleet would demoralize the American forces and get them to sign a peace settlement allowing Japan to remain as the power in the Pacific. A month after the British attack on Taranto harbor, Yamamoto decided that if war with the United States was unavoidable he would launch a carrier attack on Pearl Harbor. In January of 1941, Yamamoto first began to commit to this strategy by planning out his attack and showing it to other Japanese officials. Yamamoto developed the following eight guidelines for the attack: (1) surprise was crucial, (2) American aircraft carriers there should be the primary targets, (3) U.S. aircraft there must be destroyed to prevent aerial opposition, (4) all Japanese aircraft carriers available should be used, (5) all types of bombing should be used in the attack, (6) a strong fighter element should be included in the attack for air cover for the fleet, (7) refueling at sea would be necessary, and (8) a daylight attack promised best results, especially in the sunrise hours. Many of Japan's Navy General Staff were in opposition to Yamamoto's plan, but they continued to prepare for the attack. All of the necessary training was given to troops, and all of the fighters and submarines were prepared.
THE BOMBING BEGINS
There were peace talks occurring up until about November 27, 1941. At that time, negotiations had come to a halt. The United States put its troops on alert. On December 6, 1941, President Roosevelt made an appeal for peace to the Emperor of Japan. Not until late that day did the U.S. decode thirteen parts of a fourteen part message that presented the possibility of a Japanese attack. Approximately 9 a.m.(Washington time) on December 7,1941, the last part of the fourteen part message was decoded stating a severance of ties with the United States. An hour later, a message from Japan was decoded as instructing the Japanese embassy to deliver the fourteen part message at 1 p.m. (Washington time). The U.S., upon receiving this message sent a commercial telegraph to Pearl Harbor because radio communication had been down.
At 6 a.m.(Hawaiian time) on December 7,1941, the first Japanese attack fleet of 183 planes took off from aircraft carriers 230 miles north of Oahu. At 7:02 a.m., two Army operators at a radar station on Oahu's north shore picked up Japanese fighters approaching on radar. They contacted a junior officer who disregarded their sighting, thinking that it was B-17 bombers from the United States west coast. The first Japanese bomb was dropped at 7:55 a.m. on Wheeler Field, eight miles from Pearl Harbor. The crews at Pearl Harbor were on the decks of their ships for morning colors and the singing of The Star-Spangled Banner. Even though the band was interrupted in their song by Japanese planes gunfire, the crews did not move until the last note was sung. The telegraph from Washington had been too late. It arrived at headquarters in Oahu around noon (Hawaiian time), four long hours after the first bombs were dropped.
AFTERMATHS OF THE BOMBING
Of the approximately 100 U.S. Navy ships present in the harbor that day, eight battleships were damaged with five sunk. Eleven smaller ships including cruisers and destroyers were also badly damaged. Among those killed were 2,335 servicemen and 68 civilians. The wounded included 1,178 people. The U.S.S. Arizona was dealt the worst blow of the attack. A 1,760 pound bomb struck it, and the ammunition on board exploded killing 1,177 servicemen. Today, there is a memorial spanning the sunken remains of the Arizona dedicated to the memory of all those lost in the bombing.
News of the attack was a shock to the entire nation. The bombing rallied the United States behind the President in declaring war on Japan. On December 11, Germany and Italy declared war on the U.S., bringing about a global conflict. The United States would later drop two atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing Japan to complete surrender on August 14, 1945.